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May 1969

EDITORIAL REPRINT from C. E. M. JOAD

What Is the Soul?

G. SRINIVASAN

Determination and Moral Freedom

E. G. LEE

Religion and Karl Marx

K. R. SRINIVASA IYENGAR

Meditation and Prayer

AUGUST CLOSS

The Voices of the Nations

A Meditation on the Art of Translating : I

BOOKS REVIEWED INCLUDE

A History of Religion East and West; *Pre-Columbian American Religions*; Pt. Satavalekar's trs. of *The Mahabharata*; *Science, Religion, and the Future*; *On the Wings of Time*

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Point out the 'Way'
however dimly and lost among the host —
as does the Evening Star
to those who tread their path in darkness.

Editor:
SOPHIA WADIA

ANNOUNCEMENT

THE ARYAN PATH: June—September 1969

The Editor regrets that THE ARYAN PATH is at present behind schedule: as on 19 May 1969, the issue for May has gone to press for final printing.

The situation has arisen mainly because of the high incidence of ill-health among the small staff of the journal over the last twelve months. With a view to providing a small respite, the following arrangement has been made with our printers for the next four issues.

The issues for June and July 1969 will be bound together and dispatched at the end of July; similarly the issues for August and September 1969 will be bound together and dispatched at the end of August. The subsequent issues, it is hoped, will follow a normal course.

The full complement of pages will be published in the double numbers.

Meanwhile, the readers' indulgence and sympathy are requested.

THE ARYAN PATH

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CONTRIBUTIONS

The Editor is responsible for unsigned contributions only and is not necessarily in agreement with the views of the contributors, to whom free expression of opinion is given

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THE ARYAN PATH

Point out the "Way" — however dimly, and
lost among the host — as does the evening star
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— *The Voice of the Silence*

VOL. XL MAY 1969 No. 5

C. E. M. JOAD

What Is the Soul?

[In this month falls the anniversary of the passing away of Madame H. P. Blavatsky in 1891, commemorated by students of Theosophy under the significant name of White Lotus Day. Thirty-two years ago Professor C. E. M. Joad wrote this article for THE ARYAN PATH, May 1937; and in it he commented critically but admiringly on one of H. P. Blavatsky's philosophical articles. We reprint the article in tribute to the memory of Madame Blavatsky.

We give below a paragraph from the original editorial introduction which comments on a philosophical point raised:

"C. E. M. Joad's lucid expositions of modern culture, and especially of philosophy, are well known. He has been reading the Theosophical expositions of H. P. Blavatsky on the subject of the human soul, especially in her well-known article 'Psychic and Noetic Action' (*Raja-Yoga or Occultism*, p. 51 *et seq.*) from which he quotes. One difficulty which he presents is really non-existent; in the very book its solution is to be found. The difficulty posited by our able contributor is that the link between the Higher and the Lower Egos, or the Individuality and the Personality, is missing. In Madame Blavatsky's philosophy it is not missing. The lower, in essence, is an aspect of the Higher; turned outwards and using the brain and the senses it looks in the opposite direction, so to speak, away from the Higher. When stirred by any force or cause, the lower turns within, and a conjunction, however feeble or temporary, between it and its parent, the Higher Ego, ensues. The very basis of the Yoga system, the union between the lower and the Higher, is this connecting link. Mr. Joad himself and those who feel the same difficulty may be referred to several places in the writings of Madame Blavatsky, but it will serve our purpose to point to p. 67 of her *Raja-Yoga or Occultism*."

—ED.]

IT IS, OF COURSE, EASY to deny the existence of a soul. Scientists, for ex-

ample, complain that they have never been able, even with the most delicate instruments, to detect the presence of such an entity. Not only the soul, but also the mind, escapes their observation. Therefore, they say, in effect, there cannot be one. The assumption upon which this denial is founded is that in order to be real and to exist, a thing must be something that we can see or touch, or be at least of the same nature as what we can see or touch. If it is not, then, according to science, it must be a figment. For science is limited by the nature of its method to investigation only of those things which we can see and touch. Hence, when it comes to consider the soul or even the mind, both of which are presumably unseeable and untouchable, science is driven to deny them; they are, it holds, mere functions or emanations of the brain. It represents consciousness as a by-product of bodily processes, a sort of glow which illumines the brain, rather like the halo round the head of a saint. Events occur in the brain as a result of messages which have reached it along the neural paths that lead from the sense organs, and when the events are lighted up by the glow, we are said to be conscious of them. Since, however, consciousness is a mere by-product of the brain whose function is to illuminate it, and since it cannot illuminate what is not there, nothing can happen in consciousness unless it has first happened in the brain. Hence science leads us to a completely determinist conclusion.

The foundation of this whole way of reasoning which, under the name of materialism, dominates the Western world, seems to me to be mistaken; it is a mere assumption that only the things which we can see and touch are real, and it is a mere assumption, therefore, that the scientific method is the only method at our disposal for investigating the nature of reality. The vision of the saint, the moral intuition of the good man, the aesthetic inspiration of the artist, may all be just as revelatory of reality as the measuring rods and test-tubes of the scientist; may be and, if we are once prepared to agree that reality may contain non-physical factors, for example, deity or goodness or beauty, not only may be, but are. Take, for example, our knowledge of a human being. It might justly be said that for a true account of a human being we must go not to the scientist, but to the friend. For the sciences which tell us of his bodily constitution, his heredity, his psychological disposition, and his training do not give us the whole truth about him; they only accumulate information about particular aspects of him, e.g., his bodily system, gene-constitution, or unconscious memories. But the sum of all these aspects does not constitute a man, for a man is more than the aspects of him which science catalogues, and he is more, just in so far as he has a soul, or, as I should prefer to call it, a personality. Science, then, can give no account of personality.

There is, further, a well-known philosophical criticism of the soul or self. This in its classical form is stated by the philosopher Hume. It rests upon a denial of the existence of any introspective evidence for the soul or self. The common-sense view is, I suppose, that the soul is a kind of continuing entity in and to which there occur a number of events which are psychological states; for example, I am angry and then I am remorseful. It is the same I, the same soul which, as we should normally say, passes through the two states of consciousness. The effect of Hume's criticism is to assert the states of consciousness, but to deny the continuing element. However keenly I introspect myself I never, he pointed out, in fact come across myself. What I do come across is a desiring something, a hoping something, a fearing something, a thinking something, or, in the case in question, a something which is wondering whether there is a self; but never do I meet with the *I* who desires, hopes, fears, thinks, or wonders. If we think of the ordinary conception of the self as a string along which is strung a number of beads — the beads being our psychological states — the effect of Hume's criticism is to assert the beads, but to deny the string.

The method adopted by Kant for meeting this criticism is to make a distinction between two parts of the self, or rather between two selves, which he called respectively the empirical self and the transcendental self. The empirical self is that of which in everyday life I am conscious. To it Hume's criticisms apply; for it is, indeed, nothing but a bundle or series of phychological events. By a variety of subtle arguments Kant sought to show that this bundle or series of events cannot be all that we mean when we talk of the I. There is also, he held, a continuing self which underlies and links them together, although of this continuing self we are not normally conscious. By virtue of this continuing self we belong, he taught, to the world of reality, and escape from the everyday world of appearance of which the empirical self is a member.

The teaching of Madame Blavatsky is on similar lines. She, too, postulates two souls or selves which are broadly defined as follows. The first is body-dependent, that is to say, the events in it are determined by prior events taking place in the body; it is known as the "Lower Self," or as "psychic activity." "It manifests itself, through our organic system" and "from its lowest to its highest manifestations, it is nothing but motion."

The second self, known as the "Higher Self," is self-conscious, active, and freely willing. Instead of being a mere bundle of psychological events, like the first self, it is a unity, or rather, it is a unifying principle. It has no special organ as its counterpart in the body — for how can there be a specific organ to determine the motions of that which unifies all

organs? — nor can it be correlated with any bodily movements. It is not, therefore, located in the brain, and it has no counterpart in brain movements. Its activity, described as "Noëtic" as opposed to the "psychic" activity of the first self, derives from the "Universal Mind." Impulses spring from this Universal Mind, which is also called "the Wisdom above," which act upon and motivate the Higher Self which is an aspect of it. Our actions are the result either of the impulses which inspire the Higher or Noëtic Self, or of the motions which determine the Lower or Psychic Self; if the former, we shall by virtue of them advance to a realization of the "Individuality" of our higher natures, which are also our true natures; if the latter, our behaviour will be nearly that of automata driven by appetites which are nothing more nor less than our responses to the stimuli which reach our bodies from without.

Finally, the Higher Self is identical and continuing in and through different lives. It is the permanent element which runs like a thread through the different existences which are strung like beads along its length. The Lower Self, being a reflection of the body which determines the events that occur in it, is different from life to life, as the body is different from life to life. As Madame Blavatsky puts it:

> The all-conscious Self, that which reincarnates periodically — verily the Word made flesh! — and which is always the same, while its reflected "Double," changing with every new incarnation and personality, is, therefore, conscious but for a life period.

The distinction between the two selves is applied by Madame Blavatsky, with great ingenuity, to counter some of the difficulties raised for any spiritualized philosophy by scientific materialism.

There is, for example, the scientific doctrine of the conservation of energy which is held to be incompatible with the notion of free will. Movements of a molecular character take place in our bodies; they have effects upon what Madame Blavatsky calls "the sensory centres" in the brain. These movements and their effects take place in accordance with the law of cause and effect. What, one wishes to know, succeeds the last of these bodily movements, those, namely, which have occurred in the brain? Presumably, some form of psychical activity; something, that is to say, occurs in the mind. But if the psychical activity in the mind succeeds the brain activity as the effect succeeds its cause, it is determined by it and we are not free. If it does not succeed it and is not determined by it, what happens to the energy set going by the brain activity? Presumably, it disappears or is lost, but if it is lost the doctrine of conservation of energy is infringed. Madame Blavatsky meets this difficulty very simply in terms of her distinction between the selves. That there

are movements in the body is obvious, and they are, indeed, molecular motions; also, as science asserts, they produce their appropriate reactions in the mind. Thus the doctrine of the conservation of energy is not infringed. But it is only upon the lower mind that they produce effects. "Psychic activity from its lowest to its highest manifestations" is, indeed, as I have already quoted, "nothing but motion." But, Madame Blavatsky is careful to point out, it does not therefore follow that the Higher Self is governed by bodily movements; for since the Higher Self has no correlative organ in the body, it cannot be determined by the body.

If instead of "psychic" we call it the higher Self-conscious Will, then having been shown by the science of psycho-physiology itself that will has no special organ, how will the materialists connect it with "molecular" motion at all?

Madame Blavatsky again invokes the conception of the whole as more than the sum of its aspects or parts, to which I have already referred. (It is interesting, by the way, to note how many of the novelties which have been put forward by philosophers in the twentieth century appear in her work. This is particularly true of the modern philosophical criticism of materialist science.)

For example, what account, asks Madame Blavatsky, does the physicist give of sound? "He decomposes sound into its compound elements of vibrations." In these he inevitably fails to discover either harmony or melody. Does he, then, deny the reality of harmony and melody? Not if he is wise; for harmony, the fact is obvious, exists; harmony is real. Yet harmony is produced by certain combinations "of the motion of vibrations." The vibrations are, therefore, quite properly regarded as constituent parts of the harmony. What follows? That the method of science which is to analyse, to split up, to take to bits, is neither final nor exhaustive; for, in the process of splitting up, certain characters of the whole with which we started are lost. For, given that there are certain characters of the whole which are not also characters of the parts, for example, harmony which belongs to the music but not to the vibrations, it will follow that scientific method, which deals with wholes by splitting them into parts, will fail to provide us with any account of these characters. Thus, it has nothing to say of harmony; it can only tell us of vibrations. Its account of a violin sonata would be that the tail of a horse had been dragged on a number of occasions with specified velocities and calculable pressure over the entrails of a cat. And similarly, says Madame Blavatsky, science can tell us nothing of the self, of the Higher Self, that is to say. It can only analyse the physiological and psychological components upon whose combinations the Higher Self is manifested.

These arguments seem to me to be valid; in the light of them I should agree (*a*) that the materialists are wrong in treating of the mind, soul, or self as if it were a mere function of bodily processes. (If it is so, by the way, any argument to prove that it is so, being the product of mental activity, must itself be a function of bodily processes and cannot, therefore, prove anything about anything); and I should agree (*b*) that the soul, mind, or self cannot legitimately be taken to pieces and described in terms of its component parts.

I do not feel confident, however, that Madame Blavatsky's division of the soul into two is wholly without difficulty; for how, we want to know, do the two souls interact? Presumably they do interact, since, if there was no point of contact between them, we should no longer be dealing with an entity or person possessing two souls, but simply with two different entities or persons, and the problem would not arise. If, however, they do interact, what is the mode of this interaction? The Lower or psychic Self is, we are conceding to the materialist, a mere reflex of the body; the events which occur in it are therefore due to prior events in the body which determine their occurrence. The Lower Self is, therefore, a determined self. The Higher Self is the vehicle of impulses which reach it from "the Wisdom above." How, then, does the Higher Self make contact with the Lower and *vice versa*? For to make contact with is to produce an effect upon. If, then, the Higher Self produces an effect upon the Lower, the Lower is not *always* determined by the body and is not, therefore, wholly Lower. If the Lower Self produces an effect upon the Higher, the Higher is not *always* the vehicle of the impulses of the Higher Wisdom; is not, that is to say, always Higher. In fact the distinction between the two selves seems on analysis to become blurred. In spite of this difficulty, a difficulty which, in my case, would lead to the postulation of only one self, it is impossible not to feel the greatest respect for Madame Blavatsky's writings on this subject; of respect and, if the word may be permitted, of admiration. Writing when she did, she anticipated many ideas which, familiar today, were in the highest degree novel fifty years ago.

C. E. M. JOAD

Blessed is he who has acquainted himself with the dual powers at work in the ASTRAL Light; thrice blessed he who has learned to discern the *Noëtic* from the *Psychic* action of the "Double-Faced" God in him, and who knows the potency of his own Spirit — or "Soul Dynamics."

—H. P. BLAVATSKY

G. SRINIVASAN

Determinism and Moral Freedom

[Readers will remember the several lucid essays on philosophical topics in our pages by Dr. G. Srinivasan, Reader in Philosophy, Mysore University. The present article represents the major portion of a paper presented by Dr. G. Srinivasan at a Seminar organized by the Centre of Advanced Study in Philosophy, University of Madras, in April last year. Dr. Srinivasan, besides reviewing the general philosophical problem, makes some useful comparisons between Sartre's views and those of the Viśiṣṭādvaita school of Vedānta. The problem of freedom is completely solved only when the human soul ceases to feel itself an isolated entity. Some interesting reflections on the same topic will be found in the article "Religion and Karl Marx" which appears elsewhere in this issue.—ED.]

THERE CAN BE no moral freedom, if the individual has no option to choose between alternatives. His choice may be either between two modes of action or between a mode of action and desistance from it. But in either case the individual is responsible for his choice. Choice and responsibility always go together and both are implied in moral freedom. The individual is responsible not only for what he does but also for what he refuses to do, since both are basically matters of his choice. The individual's choice thus makes him responsible for his acts of both commission and omission.

Determinism is usually associated with a belief in God who is said to control or determine human choice. In determinism, the individual believes that God "makes" him choose what he chooses and hence the choice is not *really* his. Since the choice is not his, nor can the responsibility be his. Both freedom of choice and responsibility thus come to be denied in determinism.

The most radical form of determinism seems to be presented by Spinoza in the history of Western philosophy. His is a system of metaphysics committed to the belief in one Substance and the logic of one Substance invariably reduces the "individual being" to a "mode" of one Substance whereby "its" acts come to be interpreted as really following directly from God or Substance. Accordingly, Spinoza insists that it is only by a "trick of imagination" that we conceive of ourselves as independent and of our experiences as arising out of external particular causes, while in fact everything really follows from God.

The general tendency among philosophers is, however, to deny determinism in the interests of moral freedom. A thinker who has championed the cause of moral freedom to the utmost in contemporary times is Jean-

Paul Sartre.* He believes that if moral freedom is to be retained, the existence of God is to be denied, since that is the source of determinism. Man is free because God does not exist and what he makes of his freedom is entirely his own responsibility. There are no predetermined values which man is predestined to follow; he has himself to create values in his freedom. Freedom is the birthright of each individual and each individual has to create or invent values. But, if each individual is thus the creator of moral values, it may be feared that morality becomes purely relative to each individual and the result would be moral anarchy. This is a difficulty which seems to arise from the denial of God as the source of universal moral values. But Sartre believes that this difficulty can be easily overcome even within the limits of his own atheistic ethics. Accordingly, he insists that when a man chooses or creates a value, he must hold himself responsible not only for himself but for the whole of mankind.[1] He must choose such a value and act in such a manner that others are guided through his choice and activity. The question he has to inevitably ask himself is what would happen if all others were to choose the same value and act in the same manner,[2] and it is only when he is convinced that the value of his choice may as well be chosen and pursued by others without being detrimental to the interests of anyone that he may choose and pursue it.

Sartre thus combines individual freedom with immense social responsibility. The feeling, on the part of the individual, that his choice involves the lives of many others besides that of himself (anguish); the feeling that he *alone* must choose since there is no God or any other power either to compel him or guide him in his choice (forlornness); and the awareness of the limited alternatives of action open to him (despair) are all conditions in which he has to exercise his freedom. There can be no moral freedom in the absence of these conditions and anyone who wants to escape from these conditions seeks refuge in determinism. Determinism of values is the denial of man's freedom to create values, and is often the result of a dread of freedom. A dread of freedom arises out of the sense of immense moral responsibility which freedom implies, and hence the man who is not prepared to take responsibility on himself gives up freedom to create values and accepts them as determined or created by God, or as being eternal in themselves. But the view of values

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* I have discussed Sartre's view of freedom at somewhat greater length in my articles "Sartre and *Sankhya*" (THE ARYAN PATH, December 1966) and "Choice and Value" (THE ARYAN PATH, March 1968).

[1] JEAN-PAUL SARTRE: *Existentialism*, trs. by BERNARD FRECHTMAN (Philosophical Library, New York. 1947), pp. 21-22

[2] *Ibid*, p. 22

as essences, independent of the human act of creation, gives them a priority over human existence and deprives human existence of its freedom and responsibility in the matter of creating values. We thus find in Sartre's atheistic existentialism one of the most emphatic refutations of the determinism of values. In fact, he describes his existentialism as an attempt to draw out all the possible deductions from atheism[3] and the most important deduction that follows from it is human freedom and responsibility.

Sartre's refutation of determinism, however, deserves careful consideration. For it may not always be correct to say, as Sartre believes, that faith in determinism is born out of a dread of freedom and moral responsibility. Faith in God as the creator and guarantor of values is an expression of certain emotive and conative longings of human personality and has a positive content which cannot be wholly explained as mere absence of dread or escape from it. In fact, what is sought in faith is not necessarily escape from human freedom and responsibility but a foundation and an orientation for it. To posit the existence of God as the ground and guarantor of values does not deny human freedom and responsibility, since man is *still free* either to accept or to reject these values, and responsibility for accepting and realizing them by an act of subjective appropriation entirely rests on him. Moreover, the faith that there is a divine being who preserves man's moral achievements opens up a spiritual prospect beyond death for his ethical life. A feeling on the contrary, that all values are likewise going to be annihilated in death makes man's moral life purposeless beyond death and takes away the incentive from it. In fact, it is highly difficult to plead for the pursuit of universal moral values in an unselfish manner in the context of a philosophy of human finiteness which assumes death as the finality of human life, beyond which there can be nothing.

This is a difficulty which Sartre faces in his atheistic existentialism, and, in his attempt to meet it, he almost appeals to conscience. He points out that a man who chooses values which are conducive to his own self-interest without a sense of responsibility for others is a man of "uneasy conscience."[4] Conscience is thus made the touchstone of ethical life in the atheistic philosophy of Sartre, and it is to satisfy one's own conscience and not with the hope of any spiritual reward or preservation beyond death that a man should choose and pursue the universally applicable values.

Sartre's resort to conscience at a crucial point in his ethics is, of

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[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 60-61

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 22

course, inevitable in his philosophy because of his original non-metaphysical atheistic commitment. The subjective phenomenon of conscience falls within the structural analysis of human finiteness, unlike God, who cannot in the same sense be included in it. While this may justify Sartre's introduction of conscience into his philosophy, still it cannot objectively meet the moralist's question, Why should a man live a moral and responsible life, if nothing is going to be preserved after death *of* him and *for* him? It is in response to this persistent question that God as the preserver of values is postulated. Faith in God thus fills an emotive gap in the ethical life of man and gives it a spiritual orientation or purpose beyond death without which it lacks a sense of "completeness."

This is the reason why the theistic personalist postulates the existence of God. But he is as eager as anyone else to maintain the moral freedom of the individual, and hence it is that he is prepared to so modify the postulate of divine perfection as not to contradict the moral freedom of the individual. Divine perfection ordinarily implies supreme benevolence, omniscience, and omnipotence. Of these three attributes of God benevolence is not said to be contradictory to man's moral freedom, but the very source of it. It is believed in theism that it is an act of supreme benevolence on the part of God that He should create man in His own image as a "free" being. But, if it is asked why a supremely benevolent God did not create a perfect man, the theist would point out that "perfection" is what is to be realized by man by means of his own freedom and can never be given to him as a boon.

The two other attributes of God, viz., omniscience and omnipotence, are, however, rejected by some theistic personalists since they seem to contradict human freedom directly. The argument against God's omniscience is that it implies God's prior knowledge of man's future acts and experiences, and this makes the individual's freedom barely nominal or illusory. Some philosophers like Flew, however, have pointed out that what really contradicts human freedom is not divine omniscience but divine omnipotence.[5] For God's mere knowledge as an outsider of what a man is going to do does not affect or determine man's activity, but if He, as an omnipotent being, determines all the conditions of man's activity or negates all the alternatives but one, it amounts to predestination or denial of moral freedom. Furthermore, if God is omnipotent, nothing would prevent Him from so influencing the individual as to see that all things are done according to His own plans through the individual, while the individual may still be made to feel that he is a free agent for all

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[5] FLEW: "Divine Omnipotence and Human Freedom," *New Essays in Philosophical Theology*, pp. 144–69

practical purposes. God in this case would be a great hypnotist under whose spell the individual merely carries out His instructions or suggestions, all the while, however, believing himself to be a "free" agent. This would obviously reduce the feeling of moral freedom to an illusion, and hence Flew maintains that divine omnipotence seriously affects the moral freedom of the individual.

Another philosopher who takes a serious objection to divine omnipotence is E. S. Brightman. He recognizes a finite God, a God who is constantly engaged in fighting evil, and calls upon man to co-operate with God in His ethical endeavour. A. N. Whitehead similarly affirms that there are many unrealized possibilities in God and man is created as a "free" being so that he may co-operate with God in realizing the unfulfilled possibilities, and whatever man achieves through his freedom will be preserved by God in His "tender care."

These and several other philosophers have no belief in the eternal perfection of the individual soul — a belief which is most basic to Vedantic philosophy. Moreover, they have sought to modify the conception of God's perfection in one way or another, so as to accord to man's moral freedom a real and positive significance.

A criticism usually raised against this view is that a God who is not omniscient, a God who is finite and struggling against evil, or a God who has unrealized possibilities and is in need of human co-operation, is an imperfect God, and an imperfect God is not worthy of human worship and adoration.

Hence an attempt is sometimes made to retain the individual's moral freedom and attach a real significance to it without giving up the postulate of divine perfection or modifying it. The root cause of determinism is, in fact, not the admission of divine perfection but the structural "separation" between God and man. The Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta of Rāmānuja may be looked upon as an attempt to overcome this difficulty in its conception of God as both the *Upādāna-kāraṇa* and the *nimitta-kāraṇa* of the individual self; the individual self is regarded in this system as integral to the Divine and is described as an attribute of God. The self being an attribute of God, there can be no ontological separation between them, and the two together constitute a single substantive continuum, an integral whole or a biune reality. The conception of the individual self as a biune of Infinite-finite provides the requisite ontological basis for a fair combination of individual freedom with a sense of dependence on God. For, even if the individual were to act with a sense of complete dependence on God, the acts he performs are still *his*, since his own being is basically integrated with God, on whom he depends.

Thus, in the Viśiṣṭāvaita Vedānta, the individual is capable of assuming, and acting at, two poises of his being. He may assume the poise of the exclusive finite and act from that standpoint, in which case his freedom to act will be highly limited by the egoistic, self-separative conditions. He may, on the other hand, assume the poise of the infinite-finite and act from that standpoint, in which case the egocentric limitations of his freedom come to be removed and his freedom becomes intense and fuller.

Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta thus tries to reconcile the freedom of the individual with his dependence on God or *Brahman* within the framework of its own metaphysics. But there are two postulates which it has in common with many other systems and which are of specific relevance to a discussion on the significance of the moral freedom of the individual. The first of these postulates is that *Brahman* or God is perfect. If *Brahman* is perfect, then in him all the possibilities are already realized and there are none unrealized. This will make the individual's moral pursuit and realization of values irrelevant to God.

The second postulate is about the perfection of the individual soul. It is believed in Vedānta that the individual soul is eternally and essentially perfect, but that, during bondage, the eternal and essential perfection of the soul comes to be lost sight of owing to a false sense of "independence" from God; it is also believed that the self is free to realize its own basic and eternal perfection by overcoming the false sense of "independence" from God, and its moral acts serve as means towards this final end. But the Vedāntins insist that perfection cannot be said to have been produced or created out of moral acts, since perfection is eternal; the significance of moral acts is hence purely negative inasmuch as they remove the "obstructions" which conceal or limit the perfection of the soul, and, once the "obstructions" are removed, the eternal perfection of the soul comes to light. Thus the postulate of the eternal perfection of the soul limits the significance of moral freedom to that of removing the hindrances in the path of perfection but does not regard it in any sense as *positively* contributive to the perfection of the soul.

It may be pointed out in conclusion that the problem of determinism and moral freedom admits of differences of opinion. Moral freedom, however limited it may be, is a fact of experience for most men, while determinism is mostly a matter of faith. Whether the fact is to be interpreted through faith or faith is to be adapted to the fact is an open question and an answer to it determines the kind of philosophy we believe in.

G. SRINIVASAN

E. G. LEE

Religion and Karl Marx

[The Rev. E. G. Lee has written several thoughtful articles for THE ARYAN PATH. He is a Unitarian Minister and the author of *Christianity in Chains, Mass Man and Religion, Christianity and the New Situation,* and *The Minute Particular.* This article constitutes a large-minded and imaginative approach to something very important in understanding Karl Marx. The understanding is the more important because Marx tends to be considered almost exclusively in the light of his economics and the political problems created by nations and movements that represent themselves as following him. There is much in Marx that must seem erroneous to any spiritually inclined mind; yet there is a real moral challenge to our sense of justice in what he has to say. As the Rev. Mr. Lee points out, the inherent logic of Marx's own moral intensity demands a fuller inquiry into ultimate questions than is provided by what is today considered Marxist philosophy. The article should prove stimulating to many readers.—ED.]

RELIGION in one of its characteristics has been described as a garment of ideas with which man clothes his spiritual nakedness; not the nakedness of shame or lack but of an urgency seeking protection from the terror and wonder of its own being. Religious intuition cannot live within a void; its very potency would slay itself eventually if it attempted to do so: religious intuition must seek a content in which it can fulfil and express itself.

The content is not the same for all men; the garment of ideas may not be of the same fit and fashion; yet within it the intuition must be the same. It must bear the same characteristics, seek somehow garments which although dissimilar bear an essential similarity; be aware of its own being in such a manner that it recognizes the same overwhelming need in others. The primary fact of religion is that men need religion, not in the sense that they must in the first place interpret the world through that need, but that they must eventually place themselves in harmony with a "Something" the existence of which is one of the haunting realities of the religious intuition. "I feel that I am not my own," wrote the explorer Livingstone as one of the explanations of his martyred life in the jungle. The phrase seems to burst upon him as the full and significant answer to his life. "I am not my own" is one of the fundamental truths of the religious experience, fundamental for the mystic as well as for the hero burnt out in the magnificent purpose of his life.

It would be interesting and instructive — in view of certain modern tendencies — if this religious intuition could be discovered in such an avowed atheist as Karl Marx. The manner of its release could be still more interesting; it could poise questions of fundamental meaning for all the

secular social religion of today.

Thought of itself has never compelled man to a full knowledge of himself or of the universe. It can act as a refining process, making life more significant and real, but it can never reveal the full truth. Behind the thought of man there is an abiding and connecting self, aware of itself apart from the thought, with aims, feelings, and ambitions, which thought can discover rather than create. If reality can only be known through full experience, then full experience must know that "nothing great in the world is accomplished without passion." The notion of an abstruse philosopher or an entirely passionless scientist seeking truth simply through the mechanisms of thought is made ridiculous from all that we know of the great philosophers or scientists. And passion in this context is something more than that which can be analysed under the term emotion. Full experience means experience of the soul as well as of the mind. And what is true of the self is true of the non-self also. If figurative language can be allowed there is a soul in the universe also, a beyond which the greatest achievements of human thought can never truly comprehend or master. The philosopher only comprehends it when his system, amidst all the glaring inconsistencies which his critics can always find, pulsates with the passion for truth and inner knowledge; the scientist only comprehends it when his facts are alive with something other than facts; the full man perhaps comprehends it when his soul seeks for a cosmic reality which links his soul to what must be called the soul of the universe.

Beneath thought forms, therefore, or descriptions of the universe, no matter how true, there must abide another kind of knowledge. It might change in depth and range as the outer forms might change, but it always remains, a knowledge of the soul controlling and directing action, imperiously using other knowledge to interpret the meaning and significance of life, restlessly seeking a final awareness in which it can find the "peace that passeth all understanding." This kind of knowledge perhaps has been defined by Spinoza in the following way: "But we call that clear knowledge which comes not from our being convinced by reasons, but from feeling and enjoying the thing in itself, and it surpasses the others by far."

The truth therefore of a religious intuition should not be sought in the outer, static form of a man's thought, it should be sought in the inner dynamic content of the thought — if language can be strained, in the *soul* of the thought. A system need not be metaphysically valid, historically valid, or even scientifically valid, to contain a core of religious experience.

Now one thing seems certain about religious experience: it belongs to the paradoxical truth of what can be called "free necessity." The religious man is caught in the necessity — "I feel I am not my own" — but he is boundlessly free at the same time.

Spinoza, the theist, with his sublime temerity described this as being "slaves of God." The supreme downrightness of his mind allowed no equivocation:

> The sole perfection and the final end of slaves may be that they duly perform the task laid upon them. ...
>
> A thing which has been determined to any action was necessarily so determined by God and cannot render itself indeterminate.

Such a thought may be metaphysically indefensible, or if so lead to direct atheism, but the truth of the matter cannot be discovered in the thought; it must be discovered in the experience which the thought contains. Service for God is conscious activity in the grip of some immense power — the tool must be aware that it is a tool.

But accompanying this necessity is the supreme knowledge of perfect freedom. Life is in the necessity, and it is this life, conscious, active, controlling, and directive which endows it with freedom. Religious freedom can be likened to the creative process of the artist: a masterpiece when created can be *that* and no other. If it could be something else then it cannot be a masterpiece. The artist is swept along by the inevitability of his own creation, and the hall-mark of his achievement is the stamp of this inevitability. The free spontaneous outburst of his mind discovers itself in an inexorable march of events, swaying, controlling it, leading it up to the final inevitable creation. Unless the artist can feel this control, he is not free in his art, he is hampered, irritated, outside the stream of creation. Within the inexorable necessity he is free. The more complete the domination of events the deeper is his sense of freedom and the greater is his power. "Free necessity" is the living soul of art as it is of religion. In religion the freedom can be found in the words, "In thy service is perfect freedom."

To sum up therefore this brief description of religion it may be said: (1) Religion is the awareness of an indescribable mystery of power in the universe. (2) The processes of this power as revealed to the soul are inevitable. (3) The religious man is a tool in the grip of this power, and he is aware of it.

In the light of this summary it is possible to turn to Karl Marx.

In the first place, his life in its fundamental expression seems to have borne the characteristics of a religious intuition. He felt about him an impalpable force not only impelling him but the whole of humanity.

There were constant expressions of this before it found its final form in *Das Kapital*. In a well-known letter to his father, written when a young man at the university, he said: "I look on life altogether as a spiritual force, that seeks expression in science, in art, in one's own personality." It is significant that these words were written when he was going through an intense spiritual struggle — the "Everlasting No" struggling with the "Everlasting Yea." The outcome of the struggle was an awareness, evident in his writings and actions, that he was not "his own."

Before taking the final step which led to his exile he wrote:

> Ideas which gain the victory over our intelligence and feeling, ideas to which reason has welded our conscience, these are chains which we cannot break without breaking our hearts, these are the demons which man can only conquer by subjecting himself to them.

Long before his philosophy had been formulated he felt the weight of a power greater than himself. It impelled him into exile.

At the same time he felt the burden of suffering humanity. He universalizes this suffering in an ideal proletariat:

> A class with radical chains, a class of civil society which is not a class of civil society ... which is endowed with a universal character by the universality of its sufferings, one which does not lay claim to any particular rights, the reason being that it does not suffer any specific injustice, but suffers injustice unqualified.

In this idealized suffering proletariat Marx reinstates in his own religion the figures of the religion he despised.

His "materialistic interpretation of history" is gladly recognized as necessitarian. In the preface to *Das Kapital* he quotes with approval the words of a critic:

> Marx treats the social movement as a process of history governed by laws not only independent of the human will, consciousness, and intelligence but rather on the contrary determining that will, consciousness, and intelligence.

Running through the whole of his philosophy there is almost a fanatical belief in a determining power, in the grip of which man is but a tool. Yet side by side with this determinism is a Spinozaistic explanation. The man who knew what was happening to him was free. The end of all knowledge should be a more complete awareness of the vast "process of history," and the fact that man was caught in the grip of it. He had nothing but contempt for "Utopian Socialists" and "Universal Reforms." They were not aware of the "process of history" and therefore were not adequate tools for its purposes. The true man, the free agent, was the man who acknowledged the existence of irrevocable laws around him,

and allied himself to them. This explanation of course was shot through by paradox, but it bore all the characteristics of a spiritual intuition. He hated the religion of his day because he thought it hid or killed this intuition. It was a "spiritual aroma" rather than a "spiritual force," it was "the opium of the people" because it dulled their intelligence and prevented them from observing the grand sweep of necessity and their duty of allying themselves to it. It was Marx's peculiar way of interpreting his own experience.

His own necessity was very different from the necessity of natural materialism. He rejected the latter because it was a "materialism which excluded history and its processes." It was dead, abstract, mechanical, and it was just this dead mechanism he was in revolt against. It was atheistical in the sense that it crushed life, it was blasphemous in the sense that it used human personality to feed a dead machine. *Das Kapital*, as has been pointed out so often, under the guise of economics is a passionate moral outburst, distinguishing passionately between right and wrong and hating the wrong. Moral responsibility is apportioned in the book, very often a terrible form of responsibility, the individual being held responsible for the blackest evil in the universe, and thus leaving the individual open to the fanaticism of religious persecution. In *Das Capital* the capitalist is the embodiment of evil; the proletariat is the embodiment of suffering good. It is a drama of the conflict between good and evil, with the religious certainty, because it is written with religious conviction, of the triumph of good in the end.

For, Marx, in spite of his restraint, enjoyed Apocalyptic visions. The sudden arrival of Utopia was to be the end of his system as of other religious systems. This time of tribulation was only "pre-history"; history proper would begin when the knell of capitalism was sounded. That capitalist industry would fall was certain. The "immanent laws" of society would see to that no matter what persons might do about it. The process could be aided by the suffering proletariat, and hastened by the faithful esoteric few to whom "my system" had been revealed. These were the men and women who had cleansed themselves of dreams and falsehoods, and saw truth as Marx taught it. The end was certain, yet — the paradox of religion — it was necessary to work for the end. At the final culmination "the old bourgeois society will be replaced by an association in which the free development of each would be the free development of all." There will be no place then for the operation of the "most infamous, the basest, the meanest, and the most odious of passions." "History and the process" comes into its own.

Marxism as Marx understood it was the garment of a spiritual activ-

ity. Its contradictions were spiritual contradictions; its truths — apart from its economic doctrines — were truths founded upon religious activity. It was ugly, sometimes inexpressibly so; but it bore the ugliness of strength rather than of weakness.

But if this interpretation of Marx is relevant then religious issues sooner or later will have to be faced by Marxism. Sooner or later it will be discovered that those who deny religious truths are actually living on them, and that indeed their own philosophy cannot be explained without them. Religion in its fundamental sense possesses the means of breaking down the infallible doctrines that sometimes oppose it. There are signs that this process has begun already in Marxism. In its dogmatic sense it is likely to be broken down from within rather than from without — for the simple reason that its religious nature will not allow it to deny the paradox of religion that "in thy service is perfect freedom." But whose service? Theists believe that they can await that answer from the Marxists, and when it comes the real revolution will come in the modern world, the revolution of the spirit trying to find its home in a world in which it belongs.

E. G. LEE

Earth Wisdom

Do not tell me of beauty isolated
In the far reaches of celestial thought.
With peril that philosophy is fraught,
To breathing womb-torn truth so unrelated
It does not know that joy with pain is freighted —
Through flesh-reality, alone, is wrought
The spirit-tinctured loveliness you sought.
So truth is born of contrasts strangely mated.

With your bare eyes, the chronicle now read.
Note what the blood-warm characters disclose:
The fruit the world esteems of richest worth
To mire and mould can trace its parent seed,
Indeed, the most resplendent flower that grows
Is rooted in the worm-infested earth.

DOROTHY ELLIN FLAX

K. R. SRINIVASA IYENGAR

Meditation and Prayer

[Dr. K. R. Srinivasa Iyengar, till recently Vice-Chancellor of the Andhra University, Waltair, is an old and esteemed friend well known to our readers by his many contributions over the years. He is internationally known for his books of literary criticism and those who have read his work attentively realize that his love of literature is transfused with a devotional and religious feeling, shaped largely by his reverent study of Shri-Aurobindo's teaching. This brief article expresses his attentive study of the psychology of meditation and prayer.—ED.]

OUR FACULTIES are ordinarily prone to diffuse, disperse or dissipate their energies. We try simultaneously to see many things, hear many voices, pursue many ideas — and we also try to do them all at one and the same time. There is doubtless much expenditure of effort, but it is followed by no more than a confused incomprehension, a frustrating lack of achievement. Even with our material resources, any mere random dispersion must prove wasteful. Troops, armaments, finance, machinery, all have to be brought to effective use at some chosen point at the right time; otherwise the achieved result will have no relation to the volume of resources deployed. Concentration is simply the art of directing one's faculties or resources towards one carefully chosen end. It needed concentration on Arjuna's part to see, not the forest, not the tree, not the branch of the tree on which the bird was perching, but only the bird — or the neck at which he wished to aim his arrow. Whether it is a question of spotting a pin on the ground, or catching a word (one out of many) spoken, or determining the quality of silk from its feel in one's fingers, a particular type of concentration is always called for. This, of course, applies even more to the faculty of thinking.

Left to itself, the mind is a restless monkey, and frantically tries to think of a hundred things at once. Following the play of the senses, the mind too becomes wayward and high-fantastical. If there is to be thinking to some purpose, the mind has first to be insulated from the influence of irrelevant impressions stimulated by the senses, and only then can it be steadied to concentrate — to bring its energies to act at one point or flow in one direction. Any worth-while occupation or study — not mathematics alone! — requires such concentration. Likewise, the solution of any problem whatsoever, whether in business, administration, or personal life, demands concentration; for it is concentration that seizes and solves the problem posed by a conjunction of given facts or circumstances.

When the mind tries to concentrate, not on an everyday problem, but on the problem of "ends and means," of "first and last things," of "free

will and predestination"; when the mind tries to follow a chain of ideas starting from, say, a *mahāvākya* (great saying) like *anityam asukham lokam* (the world is neither permanent nor a source of happiness) or *Tattwamasi* (That thou art); such a self-absorbed exercise of the mind becomes meditation or *dhyāna*. If the mind, instead of pursuing, by association of ideas or otherwise, a particular chain of thoughts, concentrates rather on a single object, image, or idea, it is something more than meditation; it is contemplation: it is Thought growing paraclete-wings and exploring the infinitudes of suggestion or *dhwani* behind, say, Krishna's Flute, the symbol of the Cross, or the concept of *Nirvāṇa*.

But mental concentration, the practice of meditation, the steering of contemplation — none of them is easy. Thoughts a thousand come, from the sublime to the ridiculous, from the utterly trivial to the most momentous, thoughts mundane, thoughts sensual, thoughts speculative — and, caught in this siege of contraries, what is the mind to do? One may take the usual preparatory steps to meditation: seclusion in a room with its own enabling atmosphere, stillness of body, closure of the eyes, an appropriate posture, even breath-control or *prāṇāyāma*. Yet concentration may prove difficult for reasons like restlessness, anxiety, impatience, lassitude, forgetfulnses, nervous strain, sullenness, depression, resentment, or just (how ridiculous!) sleep. Or even when all else is stilled and the mind alone is active, its very excess of energy may raise obstacles to anything like settled concentration. The multitudinous "thoughts" surge within, as it were, or come in a flood from without. What is to be done? It is almost worse than if one didn't try to concentrate!

When one feels overwhelmed by such an invasion or submersion, one has to try to enact the inner drama of oneself observing one's thoughts come and go, but without passion and without adhesion to them. Vivekananda's tip is that one should learn to view the flow of thoughts as a natural function of the human mind, and so just let them run down and flow away. One is caught in — or has walked into — the rain: the water falls, the water drips, the water reaches and is lost in the ground, while the body is hardly affected. Let the thoughts come and go, let them exhaust themselves; let the mind learn to feel indifferent to the ebb and flow — let there be no personal involvement or identification with them!

One might adopt a subtler strategy still, says Shri-Aurobindo:

> ... the thoughts are regarded as things coming from outside, from *Prakṛti*, and they must be felt as if they were passers-by crossing the mind-space with whom one has no connection and in whom one takes no interest.

When the meditation starts and the invasion of extraneous ideas begins — and both take place (shall we say) in the theatre of the mind —

the meditative half of the mind should learn to play the immaculate *Puruṣa* and squarely confront the seething *Prakṛti* half that throws up thoughts upon thoughts with promiscuous unconcern, waves upon waves of thought coming, receding, coming again. The *Puruṣa* would then be able to view the riot or the oceanic swell of thoughts with a measure of objectivity, calling discrimination into play, weighing the thoughts and rejecting them where necessary, sensitizing more and more the instrument, the process. Let the thoughts come, but they will have to stand rigid scrutiny, they will be sorted out and judged, they may have to be firmly rejected. As the days pass, the very existence of the *Puruṣa*-censor will act as a check to the heady flow of thoughts.

Through such meditative self-observation, then, or through meditative self-censorship and the resulting rejection of the fraudulent and the fleeting, the mind should learn in course of time to scent even from a distance the imminent invasion of random or poisonous thoughts and, like fighters intercepting bombers, throw back the invasion before it has had a chance to enter the inner chambers of the mind. This would be the throw-back strategy, the discipline of effective defence from the hordes of invading thoughts. The *Puruṣa*-mind is now sovereign; he imposes a great quietude on *Prakṛti*; and the mind in the ineffable stillness of *dhyāna* can hopefully wait on God — can hold itself in attentive readiness to hearken to His whisper or voice. For each truly profound meditation ought to be a witness to something spoken, something happening, to the soul within.

Although in the first instance the disciplining of the mind through meditation — the transformation of mind the monkey into Thought the Paraclete — calls for certain external as well as internal checks and limitations, as more and more experience is gained and the practice of concentration and meditation becomes easier and increasingly like second nature, it may become possible gradually to obliterate the distinction between the normal and the meditative state, the latter becoming progressively a matter of habit, all outward actions taking place only on the surface without disturbing the inner calm. There should then be no need for scheduling fixed hours for meditation, or for imposing on oneself the external conditions of solitude, stillness of body, or breath-control, or for exercising constant vigilance to restrain the play of wrong or wayward motions of the body, mind, and heart.

At its most rewarding, meditation becomes verily a sheer waiting on God, all distracting or disturbing thought-impulses and thought-currents rejected or turned back and the mind's interior realms cleansed and becalmed and sanctified. In one so expectantly waiting on God, a prayer might rise from the heart's sanctuary for an opening of the gateway to

God. All prayer is supplication, making a request, articulating a hope, all in the immediacy of God; approaching God, waiting on Him, forging one's way through the gateway to God, almost conducting a secret conversation with God. One speaks, one asks, one supplicates — and one waits for His answer, His response. The whole point of the prayer is that God *can* be approached, He *can* be spoken to — and when spoken to, He will surely answer, He will surely speak to *us*. It follows therefore that, even as one prays, one listens too — one waits for Him to speak. And because He may not speak as we expect Him to, because our requests may be (indeed, they generally are) foolish, our fears unfounded, our speculations puerile — it will not be easy for us to catch His words or seize their import. One has to learn His language, and this may take time; and therefore one has to be patient, one has to persevere, and one needs endless humility.

But the assurance remains: knock and it will be opened to you; seek and you will find! When a mind and heart chastened and purified by the exercise of meditation articulates a prayer from the ineluctable stillness of the self, the answer is instantaneous as well as adequate — yet one might miss it, or miss its purport, being impatient or insensitive. And although one might pray as one likes, God is unlikely to grant always what one asks for; He bestows only what is good for the supplicant. The whole object of the meditation and the prayer is neither to negotiate a deal with God nor get something one has set one's mind on, but simply to cleanse oneself and get near to God and open one's heart to Him and thereby expose oneself to the redemptive power of His Grace.

K. R. SRINIVASA IYENGAR

Present Duty

If you forsake your duty where will you go from there?
for duties will confront you, all times and everywhere.
Think you they'll gild the hours with light or sweeten
them with rose;
and not, maybe, in ambush wait, as enemies or foes?
Who knows?

Appraise the present duty, perform as best you can:
delight as well as irksomeness is woven in the plan.

WILLIAM EWART WALKER

AUGUST CLOSS

The Voices of the Nations

A Meditation on the Art of Translating

[Professor August Closs, of Bristol Uiversity, is a distinguished scholar and an authority on German literature. We print below the first part of his long meditation on the art of translating. Professor Closs shows an immense and accurate knowledge of what has been done in the world of translation, as well as a sensitive literary understanding of what needs to be done and how difficult it is to do it. The second and concluding part will appear in our next issue.—ED.]

I

It is to the honour of the translator when he who reads his work forgets him.

—OTTO GILDEMEISTER
(or the "Master of the Guild of Translators"
as he has been called by Paul Heyse)

The barriers of my language are the barriers of my world.

—LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN: *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus,* v.6)

THE HISTORY OF TRANSLATIONS AND THE PRINCIPLES OF TRANSLATION has yet to be written. Where there exists an intrinsic formal and physical affinity as between the English and German languages, the incentive to translate and assimilate will be especially effective; similarly also when there exists an intellectual sympathy or readiness of acceptance, as in Goethe at the time when he was writing his *Westöstlicher Divan,* or in Hölderlin when translating Pindar. Where such an inner readiness to accept is lacking, the original becomes a caricatured copy all too easily in the course of translating. It is as though the blossom had lost its fragrance and the fruit its tender bloom.

Each country, indeed each new literary work, demands its own expression and therefore its own translations, too. It is thus worth while and necessary to examine critically the translations of the Veda, the *Book of Changes: I Ching,* Homer, Sophocles, Euripides, Virgil, Dante, Shakespeare, Cervantes, Racine, Molière, Dostoevsky, etc., into German in the separate stages of translation work: for example, the contemporary translations by Thassilo von Scheffer of Homer and Hesiod, etc., as also Stefan George's Baudelaire, Dante, Shakespeare; R. A. Schröder's Homer, Virgil, Horace; L. L. Schucking's *English Poems* from the Middle Ages up to the present day; or R. Borchardt's Dante, and the troubadours. This does not mean that the latest rendering can necessarily claim precedence over the older ones. The decisive factor in evaluation is after all the trans-

lator's poetic gifts, e.g., the translation of the Bible by Luther, Herder's folk songs, the Shakespeare of the Romantics, J. H. Vose's Homer, Tieck's Cervantes, and other works belonging to *world-literature*.

The expression *world-literature* comes from Goethe, who introduced it into literature (*vide Art and Antiquity*, 6.I.1827). Good translations have become, and are still becoming, part of *world-literature*, e.g., Pasternak's *Doctor Zhivago* translated from Russian by Mrs. Manya Harari and Mr. Max Hayward. The difficulties were obviously considerable: for instance, *krasny* means red, beautiful, fine and also revolutionary, extreme (Moscow's "Red Square" = the fine square); *slavny* = glorious, lovable; *toskd* = sadness, despair, anxiety, etc. (cf. *The Listener*, 26 February 1959).

In the knowledgeable *Mystery and Art of Translation* by Herman Buddensieg (the editor of the *Mickiewicz Blatter*), 1956, II, it is stated that the universal validity of a writer depends to no small extent on whether there exist excellent translations of his works into other languages. With a mind to far-seeing planning and advanced thinking, UNESCO encourages international activity in the field of translation in many countries by the publication of the *Index Translationum*, in which each year's translations are statistically recorded and an ever growing stock of foreign literary treasures are collected. The results are revealing: e.g., the 1954 Index informs us of the popularity of various works of authors of *world-literature*: at the top, Lenin, then the Bible, Stalin, Dickens, Gorki, Tolstoy, Andersen, Shakespeare, Dostoevsky, Balzac, etc.; among German-writing authors, according to the same annual, Goethe, Stefan Zweig, Thomas Mann, and Hermann Hesse were favoured.

Unfortunately, established literary treasures tend to be preyed upon. According to W. Widmer (in *Fug und Unfug des Übersetzens*) Heinrich Conrad's *Boccaccio* translation is almost a literal translation of Witte's version and Albert Ehrenstein's *Lukian* depends considerably on that by Wieland.

Good translations require not only linguistic mastery of the foreign text, but a fruitful meeting between two worlds. W. E. Suskind in his *Speech to the German Academy* (Darmstadt, 1956) compares the translator with an acrobat, standing in two separate currents with one leg on a raft in each stream and being pulled in two opposite directions but still wanting to go forward, in order not to cut a pitiable figure before the very eyes of the spectators. Those two separate currents represent the two languages with which the translator has to wrestle for a new form in which the original is preserved and in which his own style is not doomed to perish.

This personal element creates the mysterious image of the "original"

translation, without allowing the translator to assert himself too much. How masterly, for instance, the poet Richard Dehmel's success (in *Helle Nacht*) in recapturing the tone and the atmosphere of Verlaine's *La Lune blanche,* although the word-sounds of the original are not rendered literally! The deciding factor in every translation or new poetic version is an inner sympathy, a relationship between both worlds; for the final line of Hölderlin's *Menschenbeifall* is valid here: "Only those who are themselves godly, believe in godliness ..." This dictum corresponds to that of Goethe: "If the eye were not like the sun it could never perceive the sun ..." Where the affinity of mood, if not creative equality, is lacking, distortion occurs; as, for instance, in the translation of *Faust* (1951) by MacNeice, who could not read the original text (which in itself would not prevent a good translation). He did indeed get reliable advice from an expert source, but he failed in important sections of the translation through his unconcealed antipathy to Gretchen, whom he degrades to a bluestocking; cf. for instance: "*Nunsag', wie hast du's mit der Religion?*" = "Tell me, how do you stand in regard to religion?" Would it be possible ever to render Goethe's intention and expression in speech more miserably? On the other hand, the satirist MacNeice succeeded brilliantly in the Imperial Court scenes, the (shortened) Walpurgis Night, etc., and also with Mephistopheles in the "Prologue in Heaven"; yet again not at all with God's voice, as a comparison with the unsurpassed translation of the "Prologue" by Shelley will show. Nobody, not even the poet as translator, can jump over his own shadow!

The course of *Faust* translations has been mapped out by A. J. Frantz in his book *Half a Hundred Thralls to Faust* (1949). His work is an important contribution to the history of translation as a whole and, above all, of the *Faust* translations by professors, educators, politicians, statesmen, jurists, soldiers, and poets; see my articles on the reception of German literature in Britain and America in *Euphorion,* 1950, 1952, 1953, 1955, 1956, and H. SALINGER: "On Translating Lyric Poetry" in *Reality and Creative Vision in German Lyrical Poetry,* ed. A. CLOSS, London, 1963.

It is, perhaps, appropriate here to remind the reader of I. A. Richards's remark:

> In translation ... the expressive word in another language will not necessarily sound at all like the original word. It will be a word that is backed up by other words in a somewhat analogous fashion. (*The Philosophy of Rhetoric,* Oxford, 1936).

The example given earlier from Richard Dehmel confirms the truth of this pronouncement. Every successful translation is in fact a process of forming anew. Poetic composition and translating are the expression of

an intellectual and spiritual contact. "Free" translations can easily get too far away from the original text, and yet everyone who has ever translated from a foreign language into his own knows that translation is a process of re-creating, unless a botcher is at work who degrades it to a bad copy.

The publisher Peter Suhrkamp in his Meditations on translations quotes the "*Kalendergeschichte*" in Bert Brecht's *Form und Stoff*, in which an over-enthusiastic man has to prune a laurel tree into a spherical form, but fails again and again until he finally succeeds in attaining the spherical form, only at the expense of the laurel tree, so that the disappointed gardener cries out: "I see the sphere, but where is the laurel?" (*Deutsche Akademie*, Jahrbuch 1956, Darmstadt). Janheinz Jahn, the publisher of *Schwarzer Orpheus*, 1954, expressed also a sceptical view that the art of translating was "an art falling between two chairs"; hence it lay between science and poetic creation; yet he considered the work "indispensable." It certainly forms a link between the races of mankind. Katherina Kippenberg in her *Rilke* (p. 354) says that translations are often too clear, and that the fairy story is right when it always leaves the mermaid in her new transformation a little piece of "scaly skin between her toes." In other words a literary work can never be entirely transposed into the garb of a foreign language.*

AUGUST CLOSS

(*To be concluded*)

Yet what is common as lovely may be:
The petalled daisy, a honey bell,
A pebble, a branch of moss, a gem
Of dew, or fallen rain — if we
A moment in their beauty dwell;
Entranced, alone, see only them.

—WALTER DE LA MARE

* This is a revised version of my contribution to the Festschrift in honour of Professor W. E. Collinson in *German Life and Letters*, April 1969.—A.C.

G. HANUMANTHA RAO

Art as Dramatization

[Shri G. Hanumantha Rao, M.A., has been a teacher of Philosophy, University Librarian, and Secretary of University Publications and Extension Lectures at Mysore. Since his retirement in 1953 he has carried on research in comparative aesthetics under an award from the University Grants Commission and the resulting work on *Comparative Aesthetics — Western and Indian* is due to be published shortly. He has published several papers and books on philosophical subjects in both English and Kannada.

In this brief article he notes some sources of the concept of all artistic expression as a kind of dramatization or dramatic gesture in old Indian works, especially those of Bharata and Abhinavagupta.—ED.]

TO SAY that something is a work of art and to say that it is a dramatization (*nāṭyāyamāna*) or dramatic gesture (*abhinaya*) of inward feeling is to say one and the same thing. Towards this apparently paradoxical idea contemporary aesthetic thinking from different quarters is moving. A. K. Coomaraswamy, whose affinities to Indian thinking are well-known, declares that art is "the dramatization of subjective experience."[1] R. P. Blackmur, the distinguished American critic, says that gesture is "the outward expression and dramatic play of inward and imaginative meaning,"[2] and: "All arts are gestures of feeling in different media[3] ... Gesture is not a single essential quality but many different characteristics all rolled into one."[4] The well-known Existentialist aesthetician of France, Merleau-Ponty, also agrees with Blackmur in this respect.[5] The paradoxical character of the above statement disappears when we understand that the very manner of imagination is dramatic and hence art, to which imagination is integral, is necessarily a dramatic gesture. The aptness of the word gesture (*abhinaya*) will be seen when it is realized that the artist's entire personality is crystallized in his art and is his signature, or *mudrā* as the Indian artists put it.

This way of conceiving art as dramatization of feelings or dramatic gesture sets an Indian asking whether there is anything in older Indian thinking which converges on this idea. Abhinavagupta's name immediately occurs to us. For, as Reniero Gnoli has observed, Abhinavagupta's works contain ideas "which are still valid today and even relatively new to Western thought."[6] This article notes some ancient Indian thinking that

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[1] "Art and Craftsmanship" in *Rupam*, Vol. I (1920), pp. 4-5

[2] Quoted by W. RIGHTER in *Logic and Criticism*, p. 92

[3] *Ibid*, p. 93

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 99

[5] EUGENE F. KAELIN: *An Existentialist Aesthetic*, pp. 286, 289, 290

[6] RENIERO GNOLI: *The Aesthetic Experience According to Abhinavagupta* (Rome. 1956), p. XXXII

is convergent on this new idea.

We light upon the concept of dramatization (*nāṭyāyamāna*) as having a wider import than that confined to drama in a notable passage of Abhinavagupta's eleventh-century commentary, *Abhinavabhāratī*,[7] commentary on *Sūtra* 33. The object of the passage is to show that the gestures of actors on the stage are not like the practical gestures of persons in the actual world. They have their bearing and significance only as gestures transformed by imagination (*bhāvābhinaya*). This imaginative transformation is here called *nāṭyāyamāna*. The important point to note is that this dramatization is not confined to drama only. In poetry also, on account of dramatization alone there is *rasa* (*kāvye:pi nāṭyāyamānameva rasaḥ*). In poetry, the emergence of *rasa* is conditional upon or is the consequence of imagination presenting the content on the horizon of the mind like an object directly perceived by the senses (*kāvyārthe viṣaye hi pratyakṣakalpasaṁvedanodaye rasodaya iti*). This is called *pratyakṣakalpa*. The passage becomes clear when we understand that this *pratyakṣakalpa* is none other than the activity integral to aesthetic imagination and that the expression of this imagination is gesture (*abhinaya*) in the most general sense. Imaginative expression is common to both poetry and drama. Imaginative gesture as dramatization is the genus of which gesture in words is one species and gesture in bodily poses and postures is another. Here, imaginative gesture emerges as a universal having an import wider than that of the gesture of the histrionic art.

Though, in this passage, imaginative gesture emerges as a universal having a wider import than that of the gesture of the histrionic art, yet the concept of imaginative gesture as a universal applicable to all art is still not in view. But we should not jump to the conclusion that Abhinavagupta did not take the same view in respect of other arts like music. Elsewhere, he says that musical and poetic expressions are also imaginative gestures (*rāgakāvyādiprayogo nāṭyaḥ*)[8] and that they involve no less the presentation of content as directly perceived (*pratyakṣakalpa*).

But the credit of having conceived imaginative gesture (*bhāvābhinaya*) as a generic universal applicable to all art must go to Bharata. Bharata was acquainted with the whole gamut of fine and useful arts in both their generality and their particularities, and is considered an authority on music, dance, and the architecture of the stage even today. In taking a comprehensive view of the arts, he was forced intuitively to light upon this generic conception of *abhinaya*. He views *abhinaya* as the genus of which the gestures of various arts are species. He delimits it by indicating

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[7] *Nāṭyaśāstra* (Gaekwad's Oriental Series, Baroda. 1956), Vol. I, pp. 291-2

[8] *Ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 172

the specific medium through which imagination expresses itself in each art. Thus the gesture of poetry is called by him verbal gesture (*vācikābhinaya*); the gesture of histrionic art, bodily gesture (*āṅgikābhinaya*); expression through vital states like stupefaction, horripilation, shedding tears, or screaming, vital gesture (*sāttvikābhinaya*); and expression through dress and make-up, decorative or embellishing gesture (*āhāryābhinaya*). The very stage is an articulating gesture of imagination which compels the spectators to realize the situations imaginatively. Drama employs music and dance also as preliminaries which induce the aesthetic mood in the spectators. They occur in their own right in all their intensity when they form an essential part of the action as in *Mālavikāgnimitra*.

Though the other arts appear in drama as subordinate organs of drama, Bharata, and, following him, Abhinavagupta, make it clear that each is an autonomous art and produces a distinctive effect not produced by others. What poetry has not uttered is uttered gracefully by music (*yattu kāvyenānuktam tadgītena prasādhayet*).[9] When one art is assimilated to another it becomes subordinate to the one to which it is assimilated. Thus when music is assimilated to dance, music goes into the background and dance comes to the forefront.[10] When poetry is found in music, poetry is subordinate and what takes precedence over it is music. Each is mistress in its own home (*svakṣetra*); each can be assimilated to another only by being subordinated to what it assists. Drama is an art to which Bharata assimilated all arts. The other arts are subordinated to the primary histrionic art, so as not to raise their heads over it (*nātiprasaṅgo:tra nṛttagītayoratiprasaṅgaḥ*).[11]

Thus we reach in Bharata, through the interpretation of Abhinavagupta, the aesthetic universal of art as the imaginative gesture which presents the tensions, cadences, and resolutions of feeling as directly visible and of each art as a specific modulation of it to suit the unique character of the medium of its choice.

This aesthetic universal of *abhinaya* as imaginative expression of feelings would not be fully universal if we stopped at fine and useful arts only. It should be extended to life itself as an art. This is the province of aesthetic philosophy, which is wider than the philosophy of art. Is it not because a graceful act of charity is more than a mere duty enjoined that it is called a fine gesture? Likewise, religious rituals, social ceremonials, have an aesthetic aspect which is the imaginative expression of religious and social feelings, when they do more than merely indicate religious ideas and acts. In India philosophy is not mere "dialectical thinking

[9] *Ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 175

[10] *Ibid.*, p. 176: *Nṛttañca pradhānabhāvam gītena tadupasarjanabhāvam* . . .

[11] *Ibid.*, V, *śloka* 158

about thinking itself."[12] It includes a contemplative urge to weave the feeling of truth into the very texture of life. When this is done there is an overflow of a new significance as there is an overflow of a new meaning in poetic words; philosophy so lived becomes a poem. As Dr. S. Radhakrishnan says: "Every human life should become a poem" — which is a gesture of one human being inviting another to a sharing of values.

G. HANUMANTHA RAO

The Infinite Man

I am the seed of the wild poppy,
And that of the grasses that cover the hills.
I am the breath of the vagrant things
That move in the quiet place,
And the source of the stream
That nourishes the valley.
I am the voice in the wind,
And that of the gull that screams before it.
I am the first light of the morning,
And the darkness of the hour that precedes it.
I am all things that are, that have been,
and shall be.
Yet, in all things am I lost,
For I am no thing.
Seek not for me,
For I am not to be sought after.
But, in that still moment of thoughtlessness,
I am there.
In that moment, also, I am MAN aware.

WINSTON COOPER

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[12] *M. Hiriyanna Commemoration Volume* (Mysore. 1952), Introduction, p. 11

BRIAN G. COOPER

Towards Understanding China

[Mr. Brian G. Cooper, M.A., B.LITT., has contributed many notes and brief articles to our pages. He shows particular concern for understanding between different cultures and between different religious groups. His last article was "Seeking to Understand Japan" (THE ARYAN PATH, April 1969). This brief article seems to follow almost naturally as a sequel. It is actually a summary of some of the important contributions that were made at the Teilhard de Chardin Association conference on "Mankind Evolving: China and the West."—ED.]

THE THOUGHT OF TEILHARD DE CHARDIN, the world-famous Jesuit, scientist, and seer, whose epoch-making work *Phenomenon of Man* expounds a remarkable synthesis of evolutionary science and mystical Christianity, has many devotees across the world. Several hundred from Britain, with delegates from the European continent and the United States, gathered in London during October 1968 to consider the enigma of China in the light of the Teilhardian perspective. For Western man especially, to whom China appears as alternately a mystery and a menace, the task of extending inter-cultural understanding towards that four-thousand-year-old civilization, throughout our time plunged into revolutionary ferment, is both a very necessary and an extremely difficult one. The following extracts from the thinking of the Teilhard de Chardin Association conference on "Mankind Evolving: China and the West" are offered as a contribution to that task.

China for centuries was undisturbed by the West. Down to the end of the eighteenth century China was self-sufficient in most desired commodities; Europe was not. Chinese society was relatively stable and able to digest important scientific and technological discoveries, often transmitting them to Europe. China's government was bureaucratic feudalism, its values those of a Confucianism which saw morality as working through history, not giving rewards and punishments individually as in Buddhism. China never developed an expansionist capitalism; the twentieth-century ideology of an expansionist Communism emerged as an amalgam of Western Marxism and some traditional Chinese values, such as the prestige attached to rural Chinese man.

In the pre-twentieth-century period, Chinese philosophy was often humble, sometimes eclectic, towards other faiths and thought-systems. From the fifth to eleventh centuries especially, Chinese scholars went to India to learn Indian religion; Indian logic was taken back to China; the Chinese never claimed to be the intellectual mentors of India. Yet one profound difference always separated China from both Western Chris-

tianity and the Indic religions: unlike the latter, in China neither metaphysical philosophical idealism nor any theology of transcendence were ever in a dominant position. The idea of a creator God was largely missing; none of China's three great religious systems found a personal deity necessary; Confucianism was an ethical system with no supernatural sanctions.

The social philosophy of traditional China was a unity. In Europe, the powers of Church and State often conflicted. In China that could not be so.

> The Chinese emperor was certainly not a god, but a kind of high priest representing the people *vis-à-vis* the powers of heaven, i.e., those forces and phenomena which are so much greater than humanity itself, and yet still entirely within the realm of the natural. Again, there was no parallel to the schizophrenia of Europe, the inability of Europeans to decide between atomic materialism on the one hand, and ecclesiastical spiritualism on the other. One must also speak of the democratic elements in traditional Chinese society embodied, for example, in the famous dictum "Heaven sees as the people see."[1]

(But note the similar European dictum, *Vox populi, vox dei.*)

The virtually total absence of the dimension of the transcendent in Chinese civilization was the major reason for the relative failure of Western Christian missionary enterprise in China. Buddhism was the only foreign religion with major success in China, though of course it is very moribund there now. Christian and Marxist experts at the Teilhard conference generally agreed that Christian ethics had had their major influence upon China via Marxism, as now re-interpreted through Maoism, which also drew much upon traditional Confucian ethics.

Travellers in China, and Christian and Marxist observers of the "Cultural Revolution," discussed how far the religious dimension was present in the China of today. Professor William Sewell, a Quaker with many years' experience of the Chinese scene, set forth the contradictions in the Chinese scene:

> The great movement which has gripped China is in many ways a religion. It springs from the hopes of mankind, and is nurtured by the divine spark which Quakers are not alone in believing dwells in all men. The weakness of the new religion in China springs from a lack of focus on a power beyond that of man himself. Yet even if this is so, there remains a real challenge, especially to those who are Christian. There is much good in China: the development of the personality in relation to society, the raising of material and cultural understanding, the unselfish enrichment of life. But there is also considerable distress as the individual has sought

[1] Professor Joseph Needham of Cambridge University, world authority on Chinese science and civilization.

to adapt himself in face of the intolerance and cruelty, directed against even only suspected non-conformists, which inevitably seem to accompany a new, vigorous and of necessity over-simplified faith.

If Christianity supported the quest of the Chinese, indeed of all men, for a new society based on justice, it was at variance from Maoism on the questions of love and hatred. The Christian must condemn the hatred shown toward class enemies and those who oppose the new Chinese way of life, but also remember Christianity itself has too often in its history projected hatred upon those of other faiths. In theory, however, the Christian principle of love towards enemies, as the Gandhian principle of non-violent reconciling action, is in marked contrast to Maoism's avowal of active hatred towards China's enemies. The people of India, much more than those of us in Britain of course, know only too well, alas! that in this respect the healing of the nations seems far away. Yet the way of understanding, not the path of despair, is the only way.

From the nineteen-twenties to the nineteen-forties Teilhard de Chardin did most of his greatest scientific investigations and some of his profoundest religious meditation in a China torn apart by civil war and foreign invasion. Teilhard's message of humanity in creative evolution towards the oneness of mankind is a majestic Christian contribution to man's harmony. To that goal, East-West understanding is vital. In previous articles,[2] I have suggested that between India and the West prevail wide contacts and deep mutual understanding. In the case of China, the contacts are sparse, the mutual understanding scant. To a humanity in progress towards unity, the isolation of China, whether self-imposed or externally imposed, can only be detrimental. If, amid the turbulence of their Cultural Revolution, the Chinese can discover the significance of the transcendent dimension, the way to mutual understanding may lie open.[3]

BRIAN G. COOPER

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[2] E.g. "On East-West Understanding," THE ARYAN PATH, September 1967; "Towards Christian-Hindu Dialogue," THE ARYAN PATH, November 1967.

[3] The substance of this report is based on the talks by, and personal discussions with, such authorities as Professor W. G. Sewell, author of *I Stayed in China* (London. 1966); Professor S. Schram, author of *Mao Tse-Tung* (London. 1966); C. R. Hensman, author of *China: Yellow Peril? Red Hope?*, and such travellers as the Rev. Ian Thomson, international director of the Bible Reading Fellowship.

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New Books and Old

A History of Religion*

DR. LING is Senior Lecturer in Comparative Religion at Leeds. That the subject should be taught here is in itself a portent, as is the manner and content of the teaching reflected, presumably, in these pages. The Introduction both describes what is involved in comparative study today and indicates the broadening lines of the kind of study which still needs to be undertaken. It illustrates again the increasing importance of the subject, the way in which its frontiers are overlapping those of other disciplines, and the fresh objectivity of outlook. This is the brighter side of our age when the relaxing of some of the old astringencies has been at the cost of losing some of the old values.

This is a *history,* and fidelity to his title enables Dr. Ling to avoid many problems that might otherwise attend the organization of his material. This has been splendidly and carefully done with a system of enumeration of chapters and sections of much advantage to the reader. It is a pity that the printers have not used type more clearly distinguishing section and sub-section — the sole blemish in an otherwise characteristically Macmillan production. The main thematic titles serve to remind us that we are moving in the realm of ideas as well as of dates and events. Thus Chapter II, for example, covering approximately the tenth to the fifth centuries before the Christian era under "Prophets and Philosophers," includes the prophetic tradition of Israel and, regarded prophetically, Zarathustra of Iran and Gautama the Buddha of India, concluding with a brief but penetrating account of the sophistication of primitive religion with particular reference to Jainism, Confucius, Taoism, and Shinto. There is here, as at the end of every chapter, a summary and comment. This contributes something of no small importance. It would be easy for a book of this coverage, for which the five-hundred-odd pages are little enough, to degenerate into the purveying of slabs of material, differing from the majority of earlier books on the period only in the fact that the slabs here are historical rather than ideological. In the body of each chapter, Dr. Ling has been careful objectively to present scholarly consensus, whether single or diversified, with references for further detailed study. However, in the summaries, Dr. Ling has undertaken freedom of "interpretative comment" which knits together the chapters, keeps the movement flowing, and helps to quicken the response of the reader who might otherwise become stunned by the massive presentation of great eras and movements. The one criticism is that these sections are too short, probably a fault of modesty.

In the Epilogue concerning "Religious Belief and the Future," Dr. Ling stresses the point made from the beginning, that though comparative study is academic and not propagandist yet there is a way in which it can help religious thinking today by providing

> a less restricted and parochial view of religion than that in which we were brought up ... a wider range of evidence than we might have had otherwise, and some understanding of the historical development and consequences, good and ill, of the various forms of religious belief which exist in the modern world.

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* *A History of Religion East and West: An Introduction and Interpretation.* By TREVOR LING. (Macmillan Student Editions. Macmillan and Company Ltd., London. xxx + 464 pp. 3 maps and a Chronological Table. 1969. Hard-cover, 80*s.*; Papermac, 30*s.*)

It is significant of the author's catholicity that he does not exclude atheists and humanists, as is his condemnation of the static position of those who would limit the theological teaching of British universities to Christian theology on the ground that other systems do not lie at the roots of our culture. As a Christian, he is well aware of the significance of certain current discontents and himself highly critical of the dominant Augustinian tradition. He considers the possibility that the encounter of religions may help the necessary interpretation of his own. But here again he refuses to be parochial. Comparative study may have a calling to widen all horizons in East and West sharing their deepest religious insights and thus help to save men from bleak and nihilistic secularism, whose tenets have already deeply affected the thinking and the ways of living of Western man.

We have not thought to conceal our admiration for this book. It would be an achievement for any scholar at any stage. For one early on in his academic career it is a remarkable achievement. It may well serve to knit together the threads of the many contributions to the subject as it must surely fulfil the author's hope to "stimulate others to enter more thoroughly into this area of great potential importance within the general field of liberal and humane studies."

MARCUS WARD

Pre-Columbian American Religions. By WALTER KRICKEBERG, HERMANN TRIMBORN, WERNER MULLER, OTTO ZERRIES. Translated by STANLEY DAVIS. (History of Religion Series. Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London. 365 pp. Illustrations and maps. 1968. 65*s*.)

The commonly held view that the myth is a "purely fictitious narrative" looks like having to be radically modified in the light of mounting evidence from archaeological and ethnological research. Ample evidence of how the myth embodies historical and other truths is contained in this work on pre-Columbian religions throughout the Americas. Its German authors, two of them archaeologists and two social anthropologists, belong to that special category of the learned who succeed, consciously or unconsciously, in analysing their subject-matter completely without preconceptions.

Their respective contributions follow an ethnic rather than geographic classification. The late Professor Krickeberg concentrates first on the classical cultures of Mexico, where the first clear religious patterns may be traced from 1000 B.C., before he ventures to interpret the case of the Mayas on the strength of the scant archaeological material but much documentary evidence available.

Professor Trimborn studies the diversity of tribes in the Central Andes and southern part of Central America, where both primitive and advanced groups existed side by side.

Dr. Müller, in his examination of North American tribes, stresses the enormous difficulties encountered over their religions. Despite the very sparse population, about a million in 1600, the aboriginals were "split linguistically and ethnically in a way which has no parallel anywhere in the world."

At the other continental extreme, Dr. Zerries reviews the religious beliefs and practices of the native inhabitants of South America.

Remarkably, a number of common factors may be found amongst the religions of the many and disparate ethnic groups, for all the differences which inevitably and readily appear to distinguish from one another all the tribes scattered across such vast continents.

The fundamental basis of the cultures is the belief in a spiritual and physical power, superhuman in character, be it in Nature, in an object or an

animal, or even in a human being. Whatever the form taken by deity, it is always dualistic. The Aztecs, for instance, called their supreme god by the name "ometeotl," meaning the "god of duality." The Mayas held that "every deity has two aspects" and their gods "often even change sex." Such ideas are also found amongst the tribes of the Andes, like the Paez, and the Delaware and Iroquois tribes in North America.

Other similarities throughout the Americas include the beliefs that the earth has been destroyed and re-created several times; that there exist a number of stages, layers or rounds for the spiritual and physical transformation of a being; that there is a plurality of heavens and hells; that there is a soul surviving after physical life, which manifests itself in some rituals.

The authors unfortunately resist the temptation to draw parallels with myths and religious practices in Asia. In the preface, Krickeberg only acknowledges that there are hypothetical influences from Southern and Eastern Asia, but goes on to furnish a wealth of evidence which could support a thesis of trans-Pacific links. Yet he is ready enough to suggest, probably correctly, that the sixteenth-century Christian scribes allowed their accounts to be unduly influenced by their faith; but he has gone on to devalue the sophistication of the mythologies they were reporting upon. A better appreciation of peoples in other continents could have made this study more sensitive and penetrating.

The illustrations are few but fine, and the excellent bibliography will be especially helpful to readers already familiar with pre-Columbian religions who wish to pursue the subject more deeply. This stimulating and interesting book deserves to succeed more than its rather high price would suggest is expected.

ELYANE M. HUNT

The Teacher and the World Religions. By D. W. GUNDRY. (The Education and Religion Series. James Clarke and Co. Ltd., Cambridge and London. 160 pp. 1968. 18*s.* 6*d.*)

"The teacher needs ... his own well-informed knowledge of the world religions, which he can draw on as necessary in the course of his teaching. One of the purposes of this book is to help him to acquire this background." The author of this well-documented volume (one in a series, "The Education and Religion Series") makes it quite clear from the start that he is in no way recommending that we manufacture a "new" religion, or encourage over-much glib sampling of other folks' faiths. Rather does he urge that young people be helped to a greater understanding and participation in the religion of their family or country. Yet, with an encouragement of spiritual growth, we must not become shut away but do what we can to introduce them to "the great religions of the East." For the younger children the author suggests that we enlarge the horizon by indirect means, giving incidental information in such lessons as history, geography, and art. Later on there may be some deeper survey of the great world religions.

The chapters range from "Our Ancient Religious Heritage" to "The Four Cosmopolitan Religions" including Buddhism, and details of such others as Taoism, Confucianism, Judaism, and Humanism. What is, perhaps, most helpful is that the author writes from true teaching experience, having been in charge of religious studies in North Wales and also in Nigeria. He is now Chancellor of Leicester Cathedral. It is clear that he has a very real grasp of the complexity of the problem of the modern "global" outlook, which involves parents, teachers, and governments.

There is a helpful appendix of notes, books, and films, and a useful index. It is impossible to give a fair and just

summary of such a complex and erudite book in so short a review, but I would recommend it most heartily to all teachers and students, and to parents also.

ELIZABETH CROSS

Mahābhārata. Vol. I: *Ādiparva* and Vol. II: *Sabhāparva*. The original Sanskrit text edited with a Hindi translation by S. D. SATAVALEKAR and SHRUTISHIL SHARMA SHASTRI. (Swadhyaya Mandal, Pardi, Dt. Balsad. Vols. I & II, 20+1096 and 8+360 pp. respectively. 1968. Rs. 20.00 and Rs. 7.50 respectively.)

The text has been edited by so great a Sanskrit scholar as Pt. Dr. Sripad Damodar Satavalekar, assisted by Pt. Shrutishil Sharma Shastri. That is a guarantee for the absolute correctness and authenticity of the text presented. The same may be said about their Hindi translation. Both the printing and the get-up are excellent. The bold type used is a treat to the eye. This will be specially appreciated by the Hindi-reading public, for whom the present edition is chiefly meant. It is to be hoped that the subsequent volumes of this stupendous epic will soon follow.

The present popular edition has been made possible by financial aid from the Central Government, Ministry of Education. It is not only a welcome addition to the growing Hindi literature, but is also a great step forward in the spread of the knowledge of Indian culture so essential for national integration, which is a crying need of the day. It is true that several editions of the great epic poem, some with translation in English as well as in certain regional languages, were in the past made available; but they are either rare now or suffer from various defects. That the original text has come down to us in different recensions, with vastly varying readings at places, till recently was a serious hurdle. This has luckily been removed by the critical edition brought out by the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute of Poona. Our authors have followed the same.

The chief merit of the work lies in the fact that it is absolutely unincumbered by footnotes. The translation is concise and true to the original, in lucid and idiomatic Hindi. In spite of the great care that has evidently been bestowed on the work, printer's devils have crept in here and there, as, for instance, *Yuddha* for *Yadu* (Vol. I, Introduction, p. 15). The *Bhūmikā* or Introduction to each Volume gives, besides much useful information, a brief summary of the contents. This will be found especially helpful in locating or referring back readily to the events and anecdotes narrated: a very welcome aid to memory. The editors deserve our praise and congratulations for the care and devotion with which they have accomplished their task. The *Mahābhārata* is verily an encyclopaedia, deserving a perusal by every Indian and by all those who desire really to know India, in translation at least if not in the original.

B. CH. CHHABRA

The Meditation of the Sad Soul. By ABRAHAM BAR HAYYA. Translated and with an Introduction by GEOFFREY WIGODER. (The Littman Library of Jewish Civilization. Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., London. 148 pp. 1969. £1. 10*s*., i.e. £1.50)

Abraham bar Ḥayya, also known as Abraham Judaeus, a Spanish Jewish scholar of the early twelfth century, occupies an important place in the history of European science, partly because he produced original scientific works of his own (in Hebrew), partly, and perhaps especially, because he popularized Arabic works and made the scientific insights of his time accessible to his Jewish contemporaries and,

through them, eventually also to the Christians of Spain, Italy, and southern France. The entire range of Abraham bar Ḥayya's thinking — and an amazing range it was, too, including mathematics, astronomy, philosophy, and music — was motivated by a desire to harmonize Platonic and Aristotelian philosophy with the Jewish tradition. But while profoundly influenced by some aspects of the Neoplatonism of Plotinus, Abraham rejected others; whereas, e.g., Plotinus thought of the origins of the world in terms of a timeless emanation of matter and form, Abraham spoke of creation at a particular point in history. On the other hand, he found the Aristotelian distinction between potential and actual existence in the different terminology used in the two accounts of Creation in *Genesis,* Chapters 1-2 (*bārā,* "to create" potentially with a view to actual existence indicated by *āśāh,* "to make" and *yāṣar* "to form").

With the general acceptance by Abraham bar Ḥayya of much Neoplatonic thinking went a tendency towards asceticism, based on an un-Jewish, negative view of the material world. The treatise *The Meditation of the Sad Soul* — the word "sad" is not part of the original Hebrew title — reflects that view. The work is in the nature of a homily, and exhortation to repent, and live a life in purity and piety. It is good to see this work available in a modern English translation. The Hebrew text of it was first published by E. Freimann in Leipzig in 1860, and Mr. Wigoder has prepared his translation on the basis of an independent study of six manuscripts.

P. WERNBERG-MÖLLER

Science, Religion and the Future: A Course of Eight Lectures. By CHARLES E. RAVEN. (Cambridge University Press, London. x+126 pp. 1943. Reprinted 1968. 35*s.*, i.e. £1.75; $6.00)

It is good news that the Cambridge University Press has included in its Library Edition a re-issue of Raven's famous open lectures of 1943. Many, at the time, regarded these as the supreme expression of his ability to move with equal ease and cogency in the fields of science and theology.

Writing in the middle of the Second World War, he found the cause of man's current troubles in his inability to make sense of the world, to base a common mind on the meaning of existence and to co-operate in mutual welfare. Hence the emergence of incompatible and inimical ideologies. The blame must lie at the door not of the politicians and demagogues but of the teachers who had failed to come to terms with the flood of new knowledge. Those responsible for education, in its widest sense, had allowed science and religion to become estranged. Of the disastrous results the war was ample and grim evidence.

The first four lectures, dealing with the history of the matter, show that the conflict did not arise with Darwin and the wrong-headed reaction of the theologians to the new outlook. The last four consider how far it is possible to retrieve the situation. This section was, and is, the most important part. It deals with the threefold task if there is to develop a new world-outlook. The task is at once intellectual, moral, and religious; calling for integrity, sympathy, and community respectively.

The re-reading of the treatment of these themes after almost a quarter century recalls how many of the original hearers regarded Raven's words as prophetic. He was, of course, speaking as a Christian to a mainly Christian audience. Yet, as always with Raven, there is nothing parochial, limited, or limiting. His concern is with the bewilderment and corruption of mankind and if he finds the clue to interpretation and ultimate restoration in Christ it is in broad and sympathetic terms that he sees Christ as Head of mankind and Redeemer of all creation. There were many in the past generation who found hope and courage in these pages. They may well still speak to our condition in

1969; for our malaise is no vast improvement on that of 1943. It is a portent of some significance that the original book cost 7*s*. 6*d*. but this re-issue costs 35*s*.

MARCUS WARD

On the Wings of Time. By KAMALA S. DONGERKERY. (Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Bombay. 246 pp. 1968. Rs. 15.00)

This is a charming volume of reminiscences. Smt. Kamala S. Dongerkery is well known as a social worker and researcher into India's traditional arts, dresses, and ornaments. Hers has been a happy life purposefully spent. It has been an eventful life too — for she has played an active part in the career of her husband. S. R. Dongerkery, the eminent educationist, married her when Kamala had not yet entered her teens. They have spent together nearly half-a-century and hence this book is an autobiography of Kamala and at the same time a biography of her husband. Kamala's telling of their tale is disarmingly simple, and we have an impression of one long journey into unaltering love and mutual understanding. To those of us who belong to a self-confused generation, such a perfect union may seem strange. And yet, why not? As Smt. Dongerkery says:

> When one comes to think of it, it is not such a difficult adjustment to make. We do not choose our parents or our brothers and sisters, and yet do we not accept them with all their faults as our very own? Life is made up of diverse elements such as habits, characteristics, individual tastes, hereditary qualities, economic conditions and family relationships. In a married state these factors are no less important than love. The fact that two individuals grow up together in their early and formative years helps them mould their personalities so as to blend harmoniously with each other.

The painter in Smt. Dongerkery comes to her help when her narration falters for lack of either material or excitement. Then she is on the wings of poesy, as when she describes the significance of painting itself:

> Painting provides unrivalled peace to the mind. Concentrating on a beautiful composition of nature is like meditating. You are lost in the lovely visions before you: the intricate patterns of trees, the colourful splendour of the evening sky, the majesty of lofty mountains, the rhythm of running brooks and mighty oceans, the contentment in a thatched cottage where love and affection predominate over penury, the proud mother hen who struts along with her brood — her universe — the innocent bleating lamb tugging at its mother's udders — all give the artist those mental exercises that reveal to him by degrees the perfection of creation and enable him to realize the innate propensities of natural and human impulses. These glimpses help him to move imperceptibly towards a spiritual goal.

Reading this autobiography, we lose ourselves in a different world for the time being. There is Dharwar, "a lovely little town ... set amidst purple hills and green fields"; Chowpatty Crescent where "the heart of India throbs, and people of all creeds come together as one"; Kodaikanal, "fresh, clear and crisp, like the Scottish Highlands"; many places in Europe and, of course, Britain, a land of pilgrimage for these two lovers of English literature. Smt. Dongerkery's trip to Japan as a delegate to the International P.E.N. Conference in 1957 is also duly recorded. Characteristically she shunned Hiroshima, "the scene of a man-made disaster" and preferred the "old-world enchantment" of Kyoto. Naturally she was greatly enamoured of Aurangabad, when Shri Dongerkery became the Vice-Chancellor of Marathwada University. The description of this town and its environs is executed with a rare beauty.

The story, the style, and the accompanying photographs conjure up a youthful couple even in 1967. The formula for this permanent bloom is really quite simple as far as the Dongerkerys are concerned. Neither of them seems to have spent even an hour in idle gossip or lazy remembrance of things past.

Instead, they have preferred to work ceaselessly. The clouds of financial worry or the shadows of serious illness have not slackened their zeal in their chosen fields of activity. Purposeful work and dedication to high standards have made their lives a melodious song. At this juncture the reviewer ceases to be and the well-wisher takes over to wish this pleasant couple many more years of health and happiness.

PREMA NANDAKUMAR

A House Full of People: A Novel. By ROMEN BASU. (Navana, Calcutta. 189 pp. 1968. Rs. 9.50)

A House Full of People is a novel written in English, in which an Indian author describes middle-class family life in modern Calcutta. Published simultaneously in India and the U.S.A., the book appears to have no particular geographical milieu. The characters have Bengali names, no doubt; but are not true-born ones; the background, according to the blurb, is Calcutta, but there is nowhere any touch whatsoever of the nightmarishly pulsating life of that pullulating city; the language is English, but English of a particular variety. The joint-family system is now as dead as the dodo and when the writer "with great skill and tenderness" tilts at this social anachronism he looks as ineffectually pathetic as Sergius, who, in Shaw's *Arms and the Man,* leads a cavalry charge against artillery!

The plot is flimsy; the characters delight more in using words, words, words than in any action — particularly insipid and disgusting is the eldest member of the disintegrating Roy family, who is a sort of a *deus ex machina.* The characters of the two nephews of this paterfamilias seem to have been designed to show, in the case of one, all the so-called vices in Western society and, in the case of the other, all the so-called graces of an Indian. Particularly hateful is the former. He loathes the anti-Western conservatism of his relations but does not feel ashamed to sponge on them when in distress. Such a skulking, drivelling liar and womanizer has been modelled upon a Byronic hero in dotage and I fail to see how his affair with the pretty ignoramus, Sheila Malhotra, can be regarded as a classic.

It has become the fashion now to write novels about India for the English-speaking readers but too many of these lack any intrinsic literary grace. Shri Basu unfortunately has written a novel which lacks a convincing plot, has a set of desiccated characters, is full of unconvincing situations, and has been very incompetently seen through the press.

DILIP KUMAR SEN

Ends and Sayings

"... ends of verse
And sayings of philosophers."

—SAMUEL BUTLER: *Hudibras*

Pure mathematics, though defined as the science of space and number in the abstract, may also be called an art. Thus it is not too surprising to find its exponents willing to recognize the value of "intuition," which materialists scornfully equate with unscientific fantasy.

The University of Warwick has recently inaugurated the most advanced mathematical research centre in Britain (*The Guardian,* 11 March 1969), whose equipment, unlike that demanded by other scientific disciplines, is of the simplest — facilities for informal discussion and a large blackboard to demonstrate points. Professor Chris-

topher Zeeman, chairman of the School of Mathematics, pointed out the value of such talking. The contents of a mathematical paper take a long time to absorb by reading, but can be explained in ten minutes "because one can convey intuition without details." Intuition, as direct perception, is, of course, more than this aspect of its activity. In India the name "the Eye of Siva" is given to spiritual intuition through which direct and certain knowledge is obtainable of both outer levels of existence and the inner, noumenal levels unknown to the sciences dependent upon physical sense-data. The "opened eye of Dangma" (the spiritual seer) is another synonym, while the "third eye" of mythological tradition refers also to the same faculty. The existence of such defining terms seems to indicate that the research of the East and of the Ancients can point the way to the means for extending the horizons of science into the realm of religion (a concept misunderstood by materialists and blind-faith religionists alike). Religion concerns the divine reality underlying the phenomena of life.

"The more we know, the more we don't know." The usual pattern of development is scientific and technical experiment and invention, within a specialized field, without considering relations with life as a whole. Next comes industrial and commercial exploitation and, after a considerable lapse of time, there emerges a slow and rueful discovery of large-scale damage done by this dislocation of the balance of nature. This is followed, even more slowly, by the process of combating vested interests that have grown up around the exploitation, and of re-educating a public unwilling to give up any seeming amenity and wilfully blind to its dangers.

The Microbiological Research Establishment, Porton, England, is at present uneasily examining yet another possible menace to crops (*New Scientist*, 13 March 1969), after finding that bacteria exposed at night on their laboratory roof were quickly killed, while those inside were barely affected. None of the known air pollutants had the same lethal capacity at the same low dilution as this unknown "open-air factor." It is suggested that it is a compound of ozone traces in the air with various unburnt gases from car exhausts. Unlike "smog," whose ozone-exhaust constituents need bright light to become active, this is active in the dark. And since other ozone-exhaust reactions cause heavy damage to crops, there is strong suspicion that this hitherto unknown compound may also be guilty, and careful research becomes essential. Dare we think that these continued "plagues" that we bring upon ourselves are due to starting from the wrong end? The generally accepted practice is to begin from "particulars," attempting, by trial and error, to deduce "universals" (or rather, theoretical generalizations) from them. If men were to recognize, even hypothetically, the existence of "universals" (the knowledge of which has been pushed on one side), proceeding from them to "particulars," we might be able to advance without the terrible waste and destruction we involve ourselves in today, under the name of "progress."

For some years there has been an emotionally-charged atmosphere in Britain about coloured Commonwealth immigrants, intensified last year, following Mr. Enoch Powell's controversial public speeches. With the fear that the white population would be pushed out of various areas by the coloured immigrants and their dependants, a daunting picture has been built up generally of increasing demands on housing (already in short supply), on social welfare benefits (larger families, poorer health, etc.), and general undesirability. Following this, a policy of further restrictions and of repatriation has been loudly called for.

Here the sound advice "Don't go by impressions, check your facts" seems needed. The Institute of Race Relations

has published a survey (March 1969), *The Dependants of the Coloured Commonwealth Population of England and Wales*. Its authors, Dr. David Eversley and Fred Sukdeo, of the social research unit of the University of Sussex, estimated the maximum number of dependants possible under maximum assumptions (i.e., that every male over here brought a family in, that fertility rates were as high as in their own countries, etc.), making allowance for any underestimate in the 1966 census of coloured immigrants here. On their research-results, they state that the size of immigrant families is decreasing — half the Indian and Pakistani households and one third of the Jamaican have no children. The skilled or professional types who form a large proportion of voucher-holders generally have smaller families. The ratio of dependants to come in works out at 2.7 per voucher-holder, not 5, as claimed. The West Indians, the largest group, have few dependants still to come. Most of the coloured children in Britain were born here, and "repatriation" for them really means "deportation." Many immigrants (14,000 in 1967) emigrated again, further afield or back home. The 1968 figures support the authors' contentions, showing decreases in the number of dependants coming in.

In areas where mixed over-crowding produces problems, the tendency is to look for a scapegoat. But drawing absolute conclusions from too few examples, either thoughtlessly, or with emotional bias, leads to dangerous error and calumny.

A few years back, *The Sunday Times* (2 January 1966) published the results of investigations by its own reporters and others into currently-accepted accusations, e.g., that London taxi-drivers cheat foreign tourists by taking longer routes and by exploiting the latter's ignorance of English currency. An experienced actor, playing the role of "innocent foreigner," found, after fifteen trips, that "London cabbies are a much maligned race." Accusations of graft by local government councillors were spreading all around in 1965. The National Press went on the hunt, as specific accusations rolled in. *The Sunday Times, The Observer,* the *Daily Mail,* and the *Daily Sketch* all conducted their own far-reaching investigations. Slowly, apart from a few possible, unprovable cases, all the rest turned out to be "much ado about nothing," or "the result of uninformed or even malicious gossip." Similar occurrences go on all the time, an escalation dangerous because not recognized as such. It is only too easy to be stimulated to "righteous indignation" or to cynical gossip, when someone presses the right button. We badly need "mindfulness" (the term used by the Buddha) to discriminate between biased assertions, uninformed gossip and the actual facts. If we do not have the latter, at least we can withhold judgement.

The National Campaign for the Abolition of Capital Punishment has resurrected itself in Britain, because the five-year experimental term of the Murder (Abolition of Death Penalty) Act will expire in July 1970, and there is strong pressure in certain quarters to bring back hanging — in fact, according to an Opinion Research Centre poll (*Evening Standard,* 7 March 1969), the majority wish to do so. It is noteworthy, however, that one in four of those in the poll were ignorant of the fact that hanging had been abolished by the 1965 Act.

John Grigg (*The Guardian,* 20 March 1969) points out: "When the State executes a murderer it is exacting a penalty more terrible than the offence."

Most murder victims, he says, "die suddenly without the agony of anticipation." The murderer's "torture" is prolonged, first for the case to be held, then for any appeal, then further while the execution apparatus is prepared. "The death penalty is an instrument of barbarism."